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II
HE RECENT REPORT on deposit insurance
reform by the Department of the Treasury (1991)
calls for stronger enforcement of bank capital
requirements. Among the recommended changes
is “prompt corrective action” by supervisors in
dealing with undercapitalized banks.1 Under the
Treasury’s plan, banks would be divided into
five groups, based on their capital ratios. Those
with the highest capital ratios would be subject
to the fewest restrictions. As an incentive to
maintain relatively high capital ratios, holding
companies with banks in this first group would
be permitted to engage in nonbanking activities.
As banks move downward into groups with
lower capital ratios, they would be subject to in-
creasingly stringent sanctions, including restric-
tions on their dividends and the growth of their
assets. Banks in the lowest group, with relative-
ly low but still positive capital ratios, would be
closed unless their shareholders promptly in-
jected new capital.2
Prompt corrective action by bank regulators is
intended to reduce both the number of bank
failures and the losses by the deposit insurance
fund. The Treasury proposal would reduce the
discretion that bank supervisors have in han-
dling troubled banks, making the sanctions
against banks with relatively low capital ratios
mandatory. The policy is designed to give healthy
banks the incentive to keep their capital ratios
above the critical levels at which they would be
subject to mandatory sanctions. Prompt correc-
tive action also would constrain the actions of
undercapitalized banks which might increase ex-
posure of the deposit insurance fund to losses
and give the owners of banks with relatively
low capital ratios the incentive to inject capital
into their banks promptly, if they wish to retain
control of their banks.
The effectiveness of the proposed policy in
achieving its goals of lower bank failure rates
and reduced losses to the deposit insurance
1Department of the Treasury (1991), pp. 38-42, and Chapter
X. The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO, 1991)
recently recommended a different system of prompt cor-
rective action by bank supervisors. The GAO’s proposal
requires that the actions of supervisors be tied to specific
unsafe banking practices, defined more broadly than
capital ratios below some required level, The GAO study
criticizes the Treasury proposal for focusing too narrowly
on these ratios.
2The Treasury proposal is not as specific as some earlier
proposals. For instance, it does not specity the criteria for
classifying banks into the five groups nor does it provide
details about the sanctions to be imposed on banks in
each group. For a similar, but more detailed proposal, see
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I
fund depend on whether the actions to be taken
by supervisors under the new policy differ
substantially from the actions taken by super-
I visors in recent years in dealing with under- capitalized banks. The case for the policy of pronipt corrective action rests on the assump-
tion that, for a given capital ratio of a bank,
I sanctions under the proposed policy would be more severe than those imposed by supervisors
in recent years. In essence, the Treasury pro-
I posal is based on the view that supervisors in the past have permitted banks to remain under- capitalized for overly long periods and that
I undercapitalized banks have been permitted to engage in activities that made them more likely to fail and more likely to increase the deposit
insurance fund’s losses.
I The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the behavior of troubled commercial
banks in recent years is consistent with these
I assumptions. The paper looks at banks whose capital ratios fell below the minimum required
level for periods longer than one year. It ex-
I amines whether these undercapitalized banks violated the types of constraints that would be imposed under the Treasury’s scheme for prompt




I In 1983, federal supervisory agencies estab-
lished minimum capital requirements for all
I commercial banks. The minimum ratio of prima- ry capital to total assets was set at 5.5 percent. This minimum remained in effect until the end
of 1990, when supervisors began phasing in new
I risk-based capital requirements. The shaded in- sert lays out the coniponents of primary capital
and total assets used to calculate the primary
I capital ratio and indicates the effects of loan losses on this ratio.
Because the objective of this paper is to cx-
I amine how rigorously and consistently super- visors have enforced capital requirements in re-
cent years, it is necessary to identify undercapi-
I talized banks in terms of the capital require- ments in effect at the time. This paper defines undercapitalized banks as those with primary
capital ratios below 5.5 percent. The proposed
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policy of prompt corrective action might specify
higher capital levels as the critical levels for
mandatory actions.
This paper examines the behavior of banks
whose primary capital ratios remained below
5.5 percent for more than four consecutive
quarters between 1985 and 1989. This choice of
period reflects the fact that most capital injec-
tions occur in the fourth quarter of each year,
perhaps because of the practice of “window
dressing,” where banks devote special attention
to the capital ratios that appear on their year-
end balance sheets. By focusing on more than
four consecutive quarters, we include only those
banks whose primary capital ratios remained
below 5.5 percent through the fourth quarter
of the year in which they first became under-
capitalized.
Figure 1 illustrates some of the characteristics
of the banks included in this study. Undercapi-
talized banks fall into three groups. Those in
one group quickly raised their capital ratios by
increasing their capital and/or reducing their
assets. Another group consists of those that
were closed quickly by their supervisors. Clear-
ly, no banks in these two groups remained un-
dercapitalized for long. This study focuses on a
third group of banks — those that remained
undercapitalized for more than four consecutive
quarters.
Slow Response to Enforcement
Actions
There are several reasons why banks can re-
main undercapitalized for more than a year.
Some banks respond more slowly than others to
directives from supervisors to raise their capital
ratios, in part because they know that super-
visors lack the authority to close them because
of their low capital ratios alone. Instead, banks
must be judged insolvent (that is, with zero or
negative net worth) or nonviable by their char-
tering agencies to justify closure.
Supervisors do have a variety of enforcement
actions that they can take against undercapital-
ized banks short of closing them down. Among
the more severe are the removal of their officers,
the imposition of fines and the termination of
insurance coverage on the banks’ deposits.
Supervisors generally try first to induce a bank
to comply with banking regulations with less
formal or severe enforcement actions, like writ-
a MAY/JLINF iqgi________________________________________I
An introduction To Bank Capital Accounting
I be text ctssUlllt’S Cl 1)11511’ tln(]t’fldall(llllg ol shait’Iloltlt’is It din PaltHtllzi point In toUt’
accollnlmg pt-i iciples applied to Wi’ bCullIllte ,Old, lo roflta.’r\ c’ rapital 1)1111kb can iorego
‘,Iic’ets of c’oinnlel(i~llI)zillk, alId [lie iR’ms ill di~ idpiid P’~.’ merits to shaiehokleis t\ilhiil
the rapital accounts of hztllk’~ Ilik ilisel-t pio— knits the limited Ide prettried stock and
an nurudtn Lion to these lopic~~. Thk in— snbni-dmated notes zinc! dt’hellttlPe,~ zn-c’ in—
ftntltlrj on almtraelh frolil some of tlit’ detail eluded in toizui capital, Intl not prmiaiv capital
cd baiik capital arcounflm~.’ to U)8.3 the federal blInk 5tI~t’l\ 5015 M’t hit’
- muninunn fl’tjIiIfl’lilelil of total rapilal IC) total
1 hc ;u-c’ounting prcnelple5 ~UI1 he illustrated
zt.’,st’t’, at (1 pCI! cent
I-el erring tu Ihe balance SIU’eIs cii Ini~-
thetiral hank in tables .\ I antI .\2 constr urlec! B,.l’,etl oii the \ ahie,, 01 the items iii table
as oh Decenlhc’l- 31. 1986. Fable -~tniclicatts \ 1. the Ii~ pathetic-al hank has a pninai-~cain-
tlic’ aloes ol hala;icesbeet itt’ill~uli(k’r Ilit’ tzI ratio nI Ii percent I ab]e .\2 nchc zite,, the
,IsstJlii
1
)tinn that then’ zii’t’ ill.) lc)till lci,si, ill mipar’t on the prin’lar\ capital iatio ii the
lusci. I able ~2 is a re~keci balance sheet br hank had a loan loss Of S I ill 1986. Iii ~inipli
the ~znnc’ pt’!locI inciuaiing the ‘ifect~of SI lv the c’\altlple ~ilppose the hanI~pa~ ~n o
Ill loan lo~se~ di~ iciends or income takes. .-Uter rerogni/ing
Fahie A I Jicivid’s delillitl(UTh ol itefli¼in 1111’ SI l0~Il10~’.tht’ hztiik ~ ants to keep it,
the balance ~heet. One ol the ke~itenm for alIot~ ante for loan anti least’ losses equal to
nil!’ purpns~’ lh thit’ alicn~ zInc’’ 101- lozirt zinc] si In tO~ (‘P polcntial 1o5.’,e,’ on lhc’ i’tIllalfliIig
lease lns,a~r,. the po’~iLli1nof the ;cllonante 101’ 551) in gioss lozin~.
loan and lt’a~c’los~e,,on hit lialanc-e slleel a’~
LI nc’~alke itini on the assets ~idc’. reflects iN I he ci fec K on tlic’ balance ,bc’c’t carl be il
posilton ill the Report ol Uonc]ition ~t luck Itstcatttl in tno steps. I lu-si. the pros i~ion101
banks tile n ill) lheit super~kors. iiwrease, ill 10111 acirl it’aw lo’’,e, in I 1)Shi I— mc i ta,ecl b~
he ahe~~ zoice tailed lII’o\ i-ion lou loziii ,ffld ~ telnpocari\ InKing tilt’ iliot~ anue or loan
Ic-a~c ln’,’,i’s at-c’ e~ptnsi’ item- in We ralcula- md lca~t’hj’,st, to st. I lie nlci-ea~c-in the
tinii of ii’olit z,iicl lOs, 1 hrottglt pcnodir 1)11) wo~~ion lOP loan and lc’zist’ losses c-c’dtices
isbn, [lit’ hank incjc’asec! its ziiiott 911(1’ Ml net iuiconic (II I 981 In Si rc’I,iti~ e In Liii’
lo,tn anti leasc’ losses lo SI I MIld o~~c’, ~ul-t’ else iltistr;iicd ill table t .Ilii’ rt’c]LICtlol’. 111
cbiargr’d againsl thaI allot~ 101 c-c ather 111111 ill ilcOllIt’ of ‘I ‘tOdt(’’, 1(11111’ cztpilai 110711
iI4ainst c-1rult’llt ililOlilt’ (Ii t’qltit\ capital Si lo s.3 ref lertnn on er retained earnilugs
(hIlt ti\. - in the lust ,Ie
1
i ~n)5.’, loanS ,-nv rc’ducec] li~
- St 1t’li.I tilt’ allnnarit-e ioi (11111 ~tntl last
.\t sonic time in the pzisl the bank port-has— iil’-,’dls is letILlte(h h~St back to s3. Prnnzlr\
i’d another lii Ill 101 IliOlt’ Wa’i it~hook ~alue rapilal is ‘educed In —3 and hit ‘Tin
Lii the ditferenc e oh SI rc’’’u,ded z~ ‘‘nod— c-lpit’d rati) to 5 1)5 lt’I(t’ilt I fuse Intl es ii—
nil! thit’ I,,iiil 5 ~1 iii entlits zipilal t’Hh’t’t, !u~trate hon Wc’ loan lossi MI hank ran
tilt’ dollar zdLle 01 shart’s sold to siockholclc’r, i edtwe its prmtan capital helon tilt
lIlt! lii tulIllulaletI retained c’arrn’I,.ts he items lIThijIlItlIll rer
1
Lured let el.
itlicier ( ci~)itfli.\ccjtlitts ‘1111(9- han equits
i apiticl. that is hriuic’d life prelc creth stocl~ fIn’ rizLttIr’c ol lilt’ t-hznige it Iialaru-c’ ‘—lic-et
and suilcirdillatf’d tlott’’~anti cjebeniin-c — hate iteills 110111 tat!e .\ I to tzil,lt’ U c,tri also li-
ked n,aturit~ dates. SLIpertisor~
1
n’i’~ider lt;-,liale hiss los’,es c_in ni,tkc’ the equils of
the’-, ilt’iii’, ic’s desilCilli’’ forms oi hank cupi- liznik i1’a.rtise SIIppclsl’ lilt’ loan lcKs ‘Si l’e “5
I han c’c
1
iiits Iietatuse of thicic F15~’cjmatte i— ~nsli’~~d c;t $1 -‘ ii’cjt eaon or loan witi k’ase
ts Unit’s funds r,nsc’d hs st’lhtiU ,,tticl~Ill lns,e’- of MS St ould In,d~i’eqnits c-lllItai equal
rijnll’a,t alt’ nnf scht’duh’d to be ‘c’hn icc! In trj nenainc’ St.
‘For acddiona cocail o’ ire r’l p mum capiTal rJ
qjverrerts aocptoo by the fede’a, bank supervisn-s .r
1985 s~eGcDert.Stone and T-enn~c’985)
____ ______________ ______ _____ _______ __ I
aII
I Table Al
I Balance Sheet of a Hypothetical Bank, December 31, 1986
I Status of loan losses: none in 1986
I ASSETS LIABILtTIES AND CAPITAL Cash $ 5 Uab~mes Secur.ties ~ Deposits $92
Loans
I Gross loans $50 Oap’cah Accounts Reserve for loan and —- .. .. — lease losses 3 Equily capital 4 Net loans 47 Limited life preferrea stock





Allowance for loan aria lease /osses tne amount set as.oe to aosorb aniic:pated losses In-
c’eases in the ahowance are an expense rem n cahcu~aVngprofit and loss All cnarge-cfis of
loans ano leases are cn~rged against this capital account, ana recoveries on loans aid easec
I p’oviousy charged oft ac c’edited to th s capitai account. Goodvvlli Pu-chase p’ice of ~‘rrps that have been acourred in excess of ‘heir book value.
Equity capitai. ~nchudes the following components
I a PerpetLtab preferred stock o Common stock the pare’ staled value of uutslanding common stock c Su’pLis amount receved from the sale of cor-rrnon stock ,r excess of par or stated value d Unoiv!ded profits accumulated value of ‘eta nod earnings
I Limited life preferred stock. P’efer’ed stock witn rnatunty dates. Subordinated notes and debantures Deo~ ob~igat ens w th fixed maturity dates They a-c si.bcr- dinaled IC dopos ts ta bank tails the holders of ‘Is subordinated notes and decenrures ‘ece;s’e payment only if depositors are paid n u11
I Primary cap~falEouity capita! p:us aihowance fc’ :oan and lease losses milus goodY/h 4+3-1~5 Total capita Pirnary captal ~us hinted fe preferred stock pius suoorcnated nutos and oeben-
tures=6c1—1--a
I Primary capital ratio. Pr.rrw-y copita divided by total assets Plus alcowance f
0
r loan anc lease osses m rus gooow.ht = 6 . f98 - 1 ~ 3~= 0.06
I Table A2 Balance Sheet of a Hypothetical Bank, December 31, 1986
Status of loan losses: loss of $1 in 1986
I ASSETS LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL Cash S 5 Liabihties
Secu’t,es 45 Deposes $92
I Loans Goss loans 549 Capital Accounts
Reserve bor loan and . —
lease hosses 3 Equ’ty capital 3
I Net toans 46 Limited !:fe prefrred stock Subordinated notes and deoenturps Goodwili
I P’rnary captal 3 — 3 — 1 = 5












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































remain undercapitalized for so long, these
banks should at the very least not have ex-
perienced rapid asset growth, paid dividends to
shareholders or increased their loans to in-
siders. This paper investigates whether banks
that were undercapitalized for more than a year
indeed conformed to these constraints.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF
UNDERCAPITALIZED BANKS
Table 1 indicates that 531 federally insured
commercial banks were undercapitalized for
more than a year, about 4 percent of the average
number of banks operating in the years 1985-89.°
The vast majority (87 percent) of these inade-
quately capitalized banks were relatively small,
with total assets of less than $100 million.
Undercapitalized banks whose assets exceeded
$100 million were concentrated in the energy-
producing states of Louisiana, Oklahoma and
Texas (83 percent). Only one undercapitalized
bank (located in California) had total assets
greater than $1 billion.
Outside Texas, a majority of the undercapital-
ized banks (60 percent) were state nonmember
banks, supervised by the FDIC. In Texas, in con-
trast, 73 percent were national banks, supervised
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(0CC).7
As table I shows, a sizable proportion of the
531 banks had primary capital ratios below 5.5
percent for two years or more. In this 20-quarter
period (1985-89), 178 banks had primary capital
ratios below the minimum level for eight or
more consecutive quarters, and six had capital
ratios below this level for 16 or more quarters.
Table 1 also shows that banks in 22 states had
negative equity capital for at least one quarter.8
Some of these observations may reflect lags in
the process by which supervisors get informa-
tion on banks and arrange for their resolution;
they are not necessarily evidence of supervisory
policies that permit banks with negative equity
to remain in operation. Indeed, for most of these
banks, the period of negative equity lasted only
one or two quarters. Some banks, however, had
under the same federal supervisory authorities in the years
1985-89.
tSee the shaded insert for a description of equity capital
and the type of accounting entries that can make equity
capital negative.
I (Inpilot Forbearance Still other undercapitalized banks were
I granted official forbearance by their super- visors. Forbearance occurs when supervisors decide to forego enforcement of some regula-
tions, including capital requirements, under
special circumstances. As their losses on agricul-
tural and energy loans rose in the 1980s, many
banks turned to Congress for relief from capital
requirements. In the Competitive Equality Bank-
ing Act (CEBA) of 1987, Congress mandated cap-
ital forbearance for agricultural banks- Banks in
this program were permitted to defer formal
I
acknowledgement of losses on agricultural loans
for several years. The typical rationale for capital
forbearance is that the economic forces respon-
sible for the declines in capital ratios, such as
lower farm income and reduced prices of farm
land, are only temporary.
I In response to this evidence of congressional intent, the federal supervisory agencies estab-
lished capital forbearance programs that set
I broader terms for participation than those speci- fied in CEBA. Cobos (1989), for example, de- scribes the capital forbearance program of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
I and gives his perspective, as an FDIC official, on the objectives of the program and the actions
that banks granted forbearance are expected to
I follow. According to Cobos, banks granted for- bearance should be considered viable by their supervisors; they also should be expected to:
I 1. limit the growth of their total assets and relatively high risk investments.
2. restrict dividends to their shareholders.
I 3. limit the benefits of forbearance to insider’s, including insider loans.~
There is virtually no way to tell which of
I these three reasons explains why any particular bank remained undercapitalized for an extended
period. In fact, more than one of these reasons
I may apply. Knowing why these banks remained undercapitalized is unimportant, however’, if bank supervisors generally expect them to con-
form to similar constraints on their behavior.




6The banks included in this study are domestically owned
commercial banks. Savings banks and foreign owned
banks are excluded, as are several special purpose banks,
including bankers’ banks.










































































































































































































































negative equity for extended periods of time. Of the 72 banks with negative equity for four or
more quarters, 83 percent were in Louisiana,
Oklahoma and Texas; two national banks in
Texas had negative equity for nine quarters.
The last column of table I shows the number
of undercapitalized banks that recovered, that
is, had primary capital ratios consistently above
5.5 percent, by the fourth quarter of l989.~Only
130 of the 531 banks had recovered by IV/1989,
an average recovery rate of only 24 percent.
The 46 percent rate of recovery for banks out-
side of Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas is much
higher than the 10 percent recovery rate for
banks undercapitalized for more than a year in
these energy-producing states.
As might be expected, the recovery rates
were significantly lower for banks with negative
equity. Of the 213 banks with negative equity
for at least one quarter, the recovery rate was
only 6.57 percent, compared with a recovery
rate of 36.48 percent among the remaining 318
banks.‘°
The geographic distribution of the 531 under-
capitalized banks is quite uneven. For instance,
14 states and the District of Columbia had no
banks that were undercapitalized for more than
a year. While these 14 are not clustered in any
particular part of the country, they have one
characteristic in common—relatively liberal
branching laws (see table 2). Eleven of the 14
states permit statewide branching and the three
I 9One objection to this definition of recovery is that it
understates the actual recovery rate, because many
banks’ capital ratios fell below 5.5 percent only near the
end of the 1985-89 period. This possibility is investigated
I by examining capital ratios in the first three quarters of 1990 for those banks whose primary capital ratios were below 5.5 percent in the fourth quarter of 1989. Reclassify- ing these banks as recovered if their primary capital ratios
I rose consistently above 5.5 percent in the first three quarters of 1990 raises the recovery rate from 10 percent to 12.5 percent in the energy-producing states and from 46 percent to 55.5 percent in the other states. The
significance of these increases in recovery rates may be
I
offset by the possibility that some other banks, previously
classified as recovered, might be reclassified if their
capital ratios for 1990 were examined. Since examination
of 1990 data did not change the recovery rates substantial-
ly, the recovery rates cited in the text are those based on
observations through lV/1989.
10The difference between these proportions is significant at
the 1 percent level. See, for example, Wonnacott and
Wonnacott (1990), pp. 273-75, for the equation to test the







I Relationship between Number of Undercapitalized Banks and Bank Failures, 1985-89
I States grouped by number Number of Number of at banks undercapitalized undercapitalized tailed
one year banks banks
I None 01 7 1 or 2’ 16 45 3.51 49 40
7-26’ 146 258
I More than 2’ ~320 183 Total 531 843
I i Alabama. Ar~ansasDelawa’e Georgia Rawai ‘/ane Marylanc Miss;ss-ppi. Nevada. Nolh Carol.na SuLiti c-a~olina.than. Vermont a~cWasftr.gtoi
- A.as~a. Ar zo-ia ~cnroct.cut Idaho. New Harrpsh~r . Ne’rh Da~cta.Pennsylvania, Rhoce
Island South Dakrya. West Vi’ginia. Wiscons:n and Wyor”ing
I Kentuc~yMassachjsetts Vichaar Monrara New Jersey New Mexico New York. Oh c Oregon Icnnessee ana Virginia
i ca~iforria. Colorado. Eloroc. lit-cs Indiana Iowa Kansas. Minrosota Missou: and Nebraska
Lc0is.ar.a Oklahoma and rcxas
a MAY/JUNE 1991others permit limited branching. Only 12 of the
other 36 states are classified as statewide branch-
ing states.”
As table 2 indicates, many of the banks that
failed during 1985-89 were not undercapitalized
for a year or longer. Instead, they were closed
within a year after their capital ratios fell below
the minimum required level. For instance, 17
banks failed in the 14 states that had no banks
undercapitalized for more than a year. In the
nation, the number of banks that failed exceed-
ed the number that were undercapitalized for
more than a year. These observations suggest
that many bank failures in recent years cannot
be attributed to actions taken by banks while
ondercapitalized for e~aendedperiods of time;
many banks failed before their primary capital
ratios had fallen below the minimum required
level for a year or longer, and many banks that
were undercapitalized for extended periods of
time did not fail.
ENFORCEMENT OF CONSTRAINTS
ON UNDERCAPITALIZED BANKS
The Treasury proposal for prompt corrective
action is hased on the view that supervisors
have delayed too long in imposing constraints
on undercapitalized banks. This section investi-
gates whether the banks that were undercapital-
ized for over more than a year violated the
types of constraints that would he imposed
under the Treasury proposal.
Two constraints on the behavior of under-
capitalized banks mentioned in the Treasury
proposal are examined here: constraints on asset
growth and dividend payments.’2 A third con-
straint is also investigated: no increase in loans
to bank officers and directors (the bank in-
siders) while a bank is undercapitalized. An ex-
amination of insider loans is included because
supervisory authorities often focus on such
loans when monitoring the condition of under-
capitalized banks. Also, undercapitalized savings
and loan associations in the recent past were
found to have increased the losses to their de-
posit insurance funds through loans to insiders,
and one study has found that banks with rela-
tively high ratios of insider lending to total
assets had lower earnings and higher bank fail-
ure rates than other banks”
Table 3 presents selected information about
the behavior of undercapitalized banks. The
results are divided into regions, except for Loui-
siana, Oklahoma and Texas, which account for
most of the undercapitalized banks. This method
of presentation highlights both regional concen-
trations of undercapitalized banks and dif-
ferences in bank behavior-.
Asset Growth
When the capital ratio of a bank falls to a re-
latively low level, its shareholders have less to
lose and, correspondingly, more to gain by
assuming additional risk, in the hope of a suffi-
ciently large turnaround in income to eliminate
the capital deficiency. One way that a bank
assumes additional risk is to increase its assets.
Bank supervisors, of course, prefer to see under-
capitalized banks reduce their assets, to raise
their capital ratios.
Most of the 531 banks reduced their assets
substantially while undercapitalized, consistent
with the desires of bank supervisors. A sizable
number, however, actually experienced rapid
asset growth. At 84 banks (16 percent of the
total), asset growth exceeded 10 percent while
primary capital ratios were below 5.5 percent;
in fact, asset growth exceeded 25 percent at 44
undercapitalized banks.’4 Most banks whose
asset growth exceeded 25 percent were Texas
national banks supervised by the OCC—26 of
the 28 Texas banks in this study with asset
growth in excess of 25 per-cent were national
hanks’~
“See Conference of State Bank Supervisors (1986), p. 83.
This classification is based on state laws as of January
1986.
“Department of the Treasury (1991), p. 39.
“Kummer, Arshadi and Lawrence (1989).
‘4Twelve banks with asset growth in excess of 10 percent
were involved in mergers during the periods in which their
primary capital ratios were below 5.5 percent. Mergers
distort the measure of asset growth for the purposes of
this paper, because they increase capital and assets.
Asset growth of banks engaged in mergers does not
necessarily reflect greater leverage. Some mergers, for ex-
ample, involve subsidiaries of the same holding com-
panies, which do not change the leverage of these holding
companies. For each of these 12 banks, asset growth in
the period in which their primary capital ratios were below
5.5 percent is measured as the percentage change in the
period before or after the merger, whichever is the longer.
“See O’Keefe (1990) for a thorough discussion of the per-
formance problems of Texas banks and the problems with
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Thus, a bank must obtain permission from s Loans to Insiders
I super~ isors to pa dit id nds that exceed its cut - rent ea nings and supe ‘vi o can res rict the Bat ks a e pe mitted to make loans to I eir of- payment of divdends it a ank’ cap al atio is icers and directors (or n id rs”)2’ If a bank’
helon the requi ed 1ev 1. ° ~hout percent of sha eholders and inside s are not exact v the
I the banks in this stuth, ho~~ .r, paid di ‘idends sam gr up the shareholders have an ncent~ on tnetr common stock hile th ir prima ~ capi to Imit insider loans, b ause of the ‘moral
tal ratos ‘acrc belrn~the minimum le~ el haza d’ of hai ing instders assess their o’a n
‘Spong (1990) pp. 64-71. ‘See Spong (1990), pp. 60-63, for a description of insider
“Department of the Treasury (1991). pp X-12 through X 14 lending regulations.
I
I Fcreditworthiness. If, however, a bank’s capital
(and, hence, its capital ratio) has fallen to a
relatively low level, shareholders may exert less
constraint on insider lending simply because
they have less to lose Therefore, when banks
become undercapitalized, supervisory actions to
limit insider loans take on greater importance in
limiting the deposit insurance fund’s losses.
Table 3 displays information on the number
of undercapitalized banks that reported their
highest levels of insider lending ivhile under-
capitalized This measure is important because
it reflects the maximum exposure by these banks
to losses on such loans. A sizable minority of
the banks (about 24 percent) reported their
highest levels of insider loans when their capital
ratios were below the minimum required level)’
Djfferences in Constraints Across
Supervisors
Differences in practices among the super
visors of commercial banks may explain some of
the variation in behavior among the undercapi-
talized banks As noted above, most undercapi
talized banks with rapid asset growth were na
tional banks located in Texas In Texas, how-
ever, national banks are a majority of all com-
mercial banks in the state. The concentration of
national banks in Texas among the various
groups of undercapitalized banks may reflect
simply the relatively large share of national
banks in Texas
Table 4 examines the behavior of Texas banks
by federal supervisory agency. ‘The first row
presents the distribution of these banks by their
federal supervisory agency The following rows
show the numbers of undercapitalized banks in
various categories by federal supervisory agen-
cy. Below the numbers of undercapitalized banks
are their percentages of the total number of
Texas banks supervised by the same federal
agency. Asterisks indicate whether the propor-
tions for national banks are significantly dif-
ferent from those for state-chartered insured
banks
Table 4 shows substantial differences in the
representation of national and state-chartered
banks among the undercapitalized banks in
Texas Almost 18 percent of the national banks
had primary capital ratios below 5.5 percent for
more than four consecutive quarters, compared
with about 8 percent for state-chartered banks
Over 6 percent of national banks were under-
capitalized for eight or more consecutive quar-
ters, compared with 1.8 percent for state
chartered banks Most of the banks with
negative equity are national banks, especially
those with negative equity for four or more
quarters National banks also account for most
of the undercapitalized banks with rapid asset
growth.
Table 5 makes the same comparisons among
national and state-chartered insured banks out-
side of Texas The only significant differences in
proportions for banks outside of Texas involve
undercapitalized banks with negative equity
Significantly higher proportions of national banks
had negative equity than for state-chartered
banks The other differences in proportions are
not significantly different from zero. Thus, the
relatively high concentrations of national banks
among the various groups of undercapitalized
banks were primarily in Texas
The Behavior of Undercapitalized
Banks and their Recovery Rates
Because some undercapitalized banks violated
the constraints that would be imposed under
the ‘I’reasury proposal for prompt corrective ac-
tion, we can test whether these constraints
would have had a positive effect on bank capital
recovery rates If such constraints tend to in-
crease the recovery rate, we should expect
lower recovery rates among the banks that
violated these constraints.20
“The 12 banks involved in mergers while undercapitalized
may have had their insider loans rise while undercapitaliz-
ed because they merged with banks that had insider loans
before the mergers. To avoid such biases, these 12 banks
are classified among those that did not have their highest
level of insider loans while undercapitalized.
2OThis paper compares recovery rates across banks rather
than failure rates because the distinction between failed
and surviving banks is rather arbitrary in some cases. For
example, banks with negative equity for several con-
secutive quarters would be classified as survivors simply
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Table 4
I Distribution of Federally Insured Commercial Banks in Texas by Their Primary Supervisory Agency
I Federal supervisory agency Total number 0CC FR EDIC of banks
I Average number of banks 1985-89 916 76 705 1.697
BanKs with primary capital
I ratos below 5.5 percent for more than four consecutve quarters 162” 7 54 223 117 69°/a) (9 21°/a) ~7.66%~
I Of these undercapitalized banks number with the following characterstics
Primary capital ratios
below 55percent for etght
I cr more consecutive quarters 59” 2 12 73 t6.44%~ (2 63%.l Ii 70Qt~
Negative equity for at
I least one quarter 97” 2 18 117 ~1O 59%~ 12.63Wo~ ~2.55%~
Negative equity for tour or
I more consecutive quarters 45” 0 1 46 M 9I%~ f0.0O°/n~ ~014O/~~
I Asset growth n excess of 10 percent wh,le undercapitalized 40’ 4 65 0
t~3~~l 15 26%) 10
5
5tJ/~
I Asset growth in excess of 25 percent while
undercaptalized 26” 20 28
I (2.84°/n) (2.63%) (000°/a)
Pa:o dividends while
undercapitalized 13 0 15 28
(1 42%) (0 00°/nI (2.13°/a)
Hghest level of
insider loans whle
I undercapitalized 30” 3 14 47 (3.28%) ~3.95~t~ 11 .99%~
I Note F gves in parentheses are percentages ot the total numbe’ ofbani~s supervseo bythat agency Single asterisk V~ indicates tnat the proportion o’ banks supervisea by the 0CC -s s:gniftcantly different from the proportion of state-cha’tOred insUred banks at the 5 pe’cent evei





































—Table 6 compares the recovery rates of banks
that violated the constraints with those that did
not. The recovery rates of the two groups of
banks are not significantly different. The recov-
ery rate for banks that paid dividends is slightly
higher than that for the other undercapitalized
banks, although this difference is not statistical-
ly significant at the 5 percent level. Similarly, the
other observed differences are not significantly
different from zero.
of banks. If a bank’s capital ratio fell below the
level acceptable to supervisors, it would be sub-
ject to mandatory constraints on its behavior.
This proposal for prompt corrective action would
limit the discretion of supervisors in dealing
with undercapitalized banks.
The proposal’s objective is to reduce the num-
ber of bank failures and the losses by the de-
posit insurance fund. Advocates of the proposal
assume that imposing sanctions on banks whose
capital ratios fall below critical levels would give
the managers of healthy banks the incentive to
keep their capital ratios above the critical levels
at which the sanctions become mandatory. By
authorizing the closing of banks with low but
positive capital ratios, the proposal gives
shareholders of undercapitalized banks incentive
to inject capital promptly, if they wish to retain
control of their banks. Finally, the sanctions are
assumed to constrain the types of behaviors
that make undercapitalized banks more likely to





Recovery Rates of Undercapitalized Banks
Total number Percentage that recovered
of banks by IV/1989
Banks with asset growth
exceeding 10 percent 84 23.81
Other banks 447 24.61
0 16)
Banks with asset growth
exceeding 25 percent 44 22.73
Other banks 487 24.64
(0 29)
Banks tnat paid d.vidends
whIe undercapitatized 79 32 91
Other banks 452 2301
(1 75~
Banks that mcreasod insider
loans while undercapitalized 126 24.60
Other banks 405 24 44
fO 041


















A comparison of recovery rates in table 6
shows that asset growth, dividends and insider
loans are not important determinants of recov-
ery. These results imply that imposing constraints
on this behavior should not significantly affect
the recovery rates of undercapitalized hanks.21
CONCLUSIONS
Bank supervisoi-y reform is a major compo-
nent of the overall plan for deposit insurance
reform recently proposed by the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury. Under this proposal, su-
pervision would be based on the capital ratios
2tDaht and Spivey (1991) report similar results. They ex-
amine the characteristics of undercapitalized banks that
help distinguish between those that once again have
capital ratios above the required level and those that do
not recover. They find that asset growth and dividends do
not help distinguish between the banks that recover and
those that do not.
MAY/JUNE ieaiin the years 1985-89, many banks remained
in operation for extended periods of time with
primary capital ratios below the minimum re-
quired level. Substantial minorities of these un-
dercapitalized banks violated the constraints
that would be imposed under the proposed policy
of prompt corrective action. This behavior, pre-
sumably, would not be permitted under the
proposed policy.
The evidence does not support the hypothesis
that once the capital ratio of a bank falls below
the minimum required level, enforcing the sanc-
tions specified in the ireasury proposal would
increase the chances that the undercapitalized
bank will recover. ‘The recovery rates of under-
capitalized banks that violated these constraints
were no lower than the recovery rates of other
undercapitalized banks. Data are not available
to test the hypothesis that the failures of the
banks violating the constraints specified in the
proposal for prompt corrective action imposed
relatively large losses on the deposit insurance
fund.
Thus, if the proposed policy of prompt correc-
tive action can be expected to reduce the rate
of bank failure, this effect must work through
the incentives for healthy banks to keep their
capital ratios relatively high. To draw conclu-
sions about the strength of this incentive, it is
necessary to make assumptions about how bank
management would view the penalties to be im-
posed on banks with and without legislation re-
quiring prompt corrective action by supervisors.
Evidence presented in this paper indicates that
the sanctions imposed on undercapitaliz~banks
in recent years have been similar to those to be
imposed under the proposed policy.
First, several hundred banks were closed in
recent years shortly after their capital ratios fell
below the minimum required level. Their failure
did not result from violation of the types of
constraints that would be imposed under the
Treasury proposal. Resolutions of these cases
appear to have been handled much as they
would under the policy of prompt corrective
action.
Second, while a large number of banks had
capital ratios below the required level for more
than a year, most of them did not violate the
constraints to be imposed under the policy of
prompt corrective action.
indeed, the fact that a large share of the cases
in which undercapitalized banks violated these
constraints involves banks in one state under
the jurisdiction of one super-visory agency sug-
gests that such cases are the exception, rather
than the norm. Thus, there is some evidence
that the nature of bank supervision in recent
years provided banks with the incentive to keep
their capital ratios above the required level with-
out additional legislation.
The evidence on recovery rates of the banks
that were undercapitalized for more than a
year provides empirical support for one element
of the Treasury proposal: the prompt closing of
banks with low but positive capital ratios unless
their shareholders act promptly to raise their
capital ratios. As this paper shows, only 24 per-
cent of the undercapitalized banks recovered in
the period examined. Thus, the Treasury pro-
posal would not result in premature closings of
large numbers of banks that ultimately would
recover if given enough time.
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